We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-leader-follower game. We prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users' utility functions. We show that the competition of resource providers leads to a globally optimal outcome under mild technical conditions. Most users will purchase the resource from only one provider at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The number of users who connect to multiple providers at the equilibrium is always smaller than the number of providers. We also present a decentralized algorithm that globally converges to the unique system equilibrium with only local information under mild conditions on the update rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
D UE TO the deregulation of the telecommunication industry, future wireless users are likely to freely choose a provider (or providers) offering the best tradeoff of parameters. This is already happening with some public Wi-Fi connections, where users can connect to wireless access points of their choice, with usage-based payments and no contracts. Despite the common presence of a free public Wi-Fi network, some users may still choose more expensive providers who offer better quality of service. Another example of the deregulation trend is the analog television (UHF) spectrum, which was recently open for unregulated use in the US [1] .
In this paper, we consider a situation where wireless service providers compete to sell limited wireless resources (e.g., frequency bands, time-slots, transmission power) to users who are free to choose provider(s). We investigate how providers set prices for the resource and how users choose the amount of resource they purchase and from which providers. The focus of our study is to characterize the outcome of this interaction. We consider the general case where different users have different utility functions and experience different channel conditions to different service providers.
We model the user-provider interaction as a multi-leader-follower game. The providers announce the wireless resource prices in the first stage, and the users announce their demand for the resource in the second stage. A user's choice is based on providers' prices and its channel conditions. The providers select their prices to maximize their revenues, keeping in mind the impact of their prices on the demand of the users. As in [2] and [3] , we assume that users pay for the allocated resources instead of the received services. 1 This turns out to be crucial in achieving the globally optimal resource allocation.
The contributions of our work are as follows.
• General heterogeneous wireless network model: We study a general network model that captures the heterogeneity of wireless users and service providers. The users have different utility functions, the providers have different resource constraints, the channel gains between users and providers are independent and arbitrarily distributed, and the numbers of users and providers can be arbitrary. • Unique socially optimal allocation: We first study the problem of maximizing social welfare with a fairly general utility function. By using a novel proof technique, we show that when the channel parameters follow continuous distributions, there exists a unique optimal solution to the problem with probability 1. This is true despite the nonstrict convexity of the optimization problem. The fact that the channel gains of the same user are different toward different providers is a unique feature of wireless communications and is not captured in previous related literature on wireline resource allocations. • Existence, uniqueness, and zero efficiency loss of equilibrium: We further prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game, under an easily verifiable sufficient condition on the users' utility functions. Moreover, we show that the unique equilibrium maximizes the social welfare, despite the selfish nature of the providers and users. • Primal-dual algorithm converging to equilibrium: We provide a decentralized algorithm that results in an equilibrium oftheprovidercompetitiongame.Theparticipantsonlyneed local information during the execution of this algorithm. Providers only need to know the demand of the users, while users only need to consider the prices given by the providers. We begin by describing the provider competition model in Section II. In Section III, we discuss the socially optimal resource allocation, and in Section IV, we analyze the provider competition game. We define the primal-dual update algorithm and prove its convergence in Section V. We provide numerical results in Section VI. We discuss our results and the related work in Section VII-A and conclude in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set of service providers and a set of users. Provider maximizes its revenue by selling up to amount of resource to the users. A user maximizes its payoff by purchasing resources from one or more providers. 2 The communication can be both downlink or uplink, as long as users do not interfere with each other by using orthogonal resources. We model the interaction as a multi-leader-follower game (see [4] and [5] ), where providers are the leaders and users are the followers. We call this game the provider competition game.
We assume that the users play the game during the coherence time of their channels. This can be reasonable for a quasi-static network environment (e.g., users are laptops or smartphones in offices or airports). This means that the channel gains remain roughly constant and can be made known to all parties. For example, each provider collects its channel condition information to each user, and then broadcasts this information to all users. This assumption will be relaxed in Section V, where we consider a decentralized algorithm that results in the same outcome as the multi-leader-follower game. We discuss in details the implications of our modeling assumptions in Section VI.
A. Provider Competition Game
The provider competition game consists of two stages. In the first stage, providers announce prices , where is the unit resource price charged by provider . In the second stage, each user chooses a demand vector , where is the demand to provider . We denote by the demand vector of all users. In the second stage where prices are known, the goal of user is to choose to maximize its payoff, which is utility minus payment (1) where is the channel quality offset for the channel between user and the base station of provider (see Example 1 and Assumption 2), and is an increasing and concave utility function. In the first stage, a provider chooses price to maximize its revenue subject to the resource constraint , while taking into account the effect of the price on the demand of the users in the second stage. We consider linear pricing with no price discrimination across the users.
We remark that the provider-user interaction may be modeled also as a one-stage game where the user's demand choices are deterministic functions of the prices. We choose to model it as a two-stage game instead mainly for the sake of clarity, but also to account for an important technical reason. Here, we give a preview of the issue, which will be explained in detail later on.
Namely, there are game instances when some user's maximizer vector is not unique (we call such users "undecided user" later on in the analysis). In such instances, exactly one choice of demand of this user will lead to a desirable outcome, while others will not. Hence, a user needs to be strategic, and its impact cannot be replaced with a deterministic function of prices.
Under this model, a user is allowed to purchase from several providers at the same time. For this to be feasible, a user's device might need to have several wireless interfaces. Mathematically, the solution of this model gives an upper bound on best performance of any situation where users are constrained to purchase from one provider alone. Interestingly, our results show that for no less than users, the optimal strategy is to choose exactly one provider.
Next, we give a concrete example of how our model is mapped into a physical wireless system.
Example 1: Consider wireless providers operating on orthogonal frequency bands . Let be the fraction of time that user is allowed to transmit exclusively on the frequency band of provider , with the constraint . Furthermore, assume that each user has a peak power constraint . We can then define , where is the channel gain and is the Gaussian noise variance for the channel between user and network . In this case, a user's payoff is the difference between its utility function (in terms of total rate) and payments, . Although the channel quality offset factor represents channel capacity in Example 1, it can be any increasing function of the channel strength depending on the specific application scenario.
Finally, we remark that the problem shares certain similarity with the multipath routing problem in a generalized network flow setting, where each source corresponds to a user and each link corresponds to a provider. The key difference is that in our model the user-provider connections have different weights, which is not the case for the multipath routing problem.
B. Model Assumptions
We make the following assumptions throughout this paper. Assumption 1: (Utility Functions): For every user is differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave in . This is a standard way to model elastic data applications in network literature (see, e.g., [6] ).
Assumption 2: (Channel Quality Offsets and Channel Gains): Channel quality offsets are drawn independently from continuous, possibly different distributions. In particular, for any . The channel quality offset accounts for the effect that buying the same amount of resource from different providers typically has different effects on a user's quality of service. As Example 1 shows, channel quality offset may be a function of the channel gain between user and provider . In this case, the assumption is fulfilled if channel gains are drawn from independent continuous probability distribution (e.g., Rayleigh, Rician, distance-based path-loss model).
Assumption 3: (Atomic and Price-Taking Users): The demand for an atomic user is not infinitely small and can have an impact on providers' prices. Precise characterization of this impact is one of the focuses of this paper. On the other hand, users are price-takers by the assumption of the two-stage game and do not strategically influence prices.
To analyze the properties of the provider competition game, in Section III we study a related socially optimal resource allocation problem and show the uniqueness of its solution in terms of users' demands. Then, in Section IV, we come back to the provider competition game. We show that the unique socially optimal solution corresponds to the unique equilibrium of the provider competition game, in which case the selfish and strategic behavior of providers and users leads to zero efficiency loss.
III. SOCIAL OPTIMUM

A. Social Welfare Maximization
In this section, we consider a social welfare problem, which aims at maximizing the sum of payoffs of all participants, (users and providers). The social welfare problem is equivalent to maximizing the sum of users' utility functions since the payments between users and providers cancel out. We show the uniqueness of its solution in terms of users' demands. For clarity of exposition, we define the following notation. 
over (5) For clarity, we expressed the SWO in terms of two different variables: effective resource vector and demand vector , even though the problem can be expressed entirely in terms of . In particular, a vector uniquely determines a vector through (3), i.e., we can write as . With some abuse of notation, we will write when we mean . The SWO is a maximization problem with no strategic interactions; it is essentially a resource distribution by a benevolent social planner. The equality in (4) can be replaced by the inequality " " without affecting the solution of SWO, due to the monotonicity of 's in (Assumption 1). Lemma 1: The social welfare optimization problem SWO has a unique optimal solution .
Proof: Since is strictly concave in , then is strictly concave in . The feasible region defined by constraints (3)-(5) is convex. Hence, has a unique optimal solution subject to constraints (3)-(5).
B. Uniqueness of the Socially Optimal Demand Vector
Even though 's are strictly concave in , they are not strictly concave in the demand vector . Hence, SWO is nonstrictly concave in . It is well known that a nonstrictly concave maximization problem might have several different global optimizers (several different demand vectors in our case) (see, e.g., [7] and [8] ). In particular, one can choose 's, 's, and 's in such a way that a demand maximizing vector of SWO is not unique. However, we can show that such cases arise with zero probability whenever channel offsets factors 's are independent random variables drawn from continuous distributions (see Assumption 2).
In the remainder of this section, we show that SWO has a unique maximizing demand vector with probability 1. We begin by proving Lemma 2, which is an intermediate result stating that any two maximizing demand vectors of SWO must have different nonzero components. We then observe that any convex combination of two maximizing demand vectors is also a maximizing demand vector. Finally, we show that all convex combinations of maximizing demand vectors have the same nonzero components, which is a contradiction with Lemma 2. This proves the main result of this section (Theorem 3).
To make our argument precise, we first define the support set of a demand vector as follows.
Definition 2: (Support Set): The support set of a demand vector contains the indices of its nonzero entries Given a demand vector , the ordered collection of support sets is denoted by . The support set contains providers from which user gets strictly positive resources.
Lemma 2: Let be an optimal solution of SWO (a maximizing demand vector) and
be the corresponding collection of support sets. Then, is almost surely 3 the unique maximizing demand vector corresponding to . Proof: For a maximizing demand vector , (3)-(5) hold, with . To prove the lemma, we will uniquely construct from and . We can divide the users into two categories. The single-source users get served by only one provider , and the multisource users by several . It is also possible that some users get no resource from any provider, but without loss of generality, we treat such users as single-source. Recall that for all users, we have . For a single-source user who is served by only one provider , this reduces to , and the corresponding unique demand vector is . For multisource users, finding the unique is less straightforward as there is more than one such that . To show that the demand of multisource users is unique, we construct the bipartite graph representation (BGR) of the undecided users' support sets as follows. We represent multisource users by circles, and providers of those users as squares. We place an edge between a provider node and a user node if . We give an example of a BGR in Fig. 1, where , and . The BGR has the following properties 4 (see Fig. 1 ). 1) The sum of effective resource on all the edges connected to user is the optimal effective resource . Borrowing from coding theory and with some abuse of terminology, we call the check-sum of user node .
2) The sum of all edges connected to provider node equals to the difference between the supply and the demand from decided users who connect to provider :
. We call the check-sum of provider node .
3) With probability 1, the BGR does not contain any loops.
Here we need to use Assumption 2. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix-A. As it is the case in Fig. 1 , the number of multisource users is smaller than the number of providers. This is a direct consequence of Property 3), and will be proved later.
We can use the BGR to uniquely determine the demands of multisource users. Here, we use Fig. 1 as an illustrative example; the formal description is given in Appendix-B. We call this procedure the BGR decoding algorithm. Consider leaf node (a node with only one edge) and edge . The BGR implies that user 4 is the only multisource customer of provider . Since the demands of all single-source users have been determined, then we know that . We can then remove edge and node from the BGR and update the check-sum value of node 4 to . Now consider node 4 and edge . Since edge is now the only edge connecting with user node 4, we have , and hence . Next, we can consider node , or , and so on. Property 3) is crucial in this procedure since it guarantees that we can always find a leaf node in the reduced graph.
In each step of the algorithm, we determine the unique value of associated with the edge of one leaf. This value is independent of the order in which we pick the leaf nodes, as seen from Appendix-B. Thus, we can construct unique demand vector for each multisource user . Together with the unique demand vectors of the single-source users, we have found the unique maximizing demand vector of SWO with support sets . Theorem 3: The social welfare optimization problem SWO has a unique maximizing solution with probability 1.
Proof: The detailed proof is in [49] . Here, we provide an outline. Assume there exist two maximizing demand vectors of SWO that, by Lemma 2, have different supports sets. The support set of a nontrivial convex combination of any two nonnegative vectors is the union of support sets of these two vectors. Hence, all convex combinations of two maximizing demand vectors of SWO, which are also maximizing demand vectors, have the same support. This is a contradiction to Lemma 2.
We would like to emphasize that we do not need to know the precise value of to show the uniqueness of . If a genie tells us the unique value of , we can calculate the unique value of . Hence, is unique even if we do not know the value of .
Furthermore, we want to point out that the uniqueness of is a direct consequence of Assumption 2. Without such an assumption (i.e., if channel offsets are not drawn from independent and continuous distributions), we will not be able to show Property 3) of the BGR, and hence cannot guarantee the uniqueness of .
Given an optimal demand vector of the SWO problem, there exists a unique corresponding Lagrangue multiplier vector , associated with the resource constraints of providers [9] . Next, we show that is the unique equilibrium of the provider competition game defined in Section II.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-STAGE GAME In this section, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium (defined more precisely shortly) of the multi-leader-follower provider competition game. In particular, this equilibrium corresponds to the unique social optimal solution of SWO and the associated Lagrange multipliers. The idea is to interpret the Lagrange multipliers as the prices announced by the providers. Moreover, we show that there are at most multisource users at this equilibrium.
First, we define the equilibrium concept [10] .
Definition 3: [Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)]:
Aprice demand tuple is a subgame perfect equilibrium for the provider competition game if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally at any stage of the game. In particular, each user maximizes its payoff given prices . Each provider maximizes its revenue given other providers' prices and the users' demand . We will compute the equilibrium concept using backward induction. In Stage II, we will compute the best response of the users as a function of any given price vector . Then, in Stage I, we will compute the equilibrium prices . For equilibrium prices , the best response of the users is uniquely determined via BGR decoding.
A. Equilibrium Strategy of the Users in Stage II
Consider users facing prices in the second stage. Each user solves a user payoff maximization (UPM) problem (6) Lemma 4: For each user , there exists a unique nonnegative value , such that for every maximizer of the UPM problem. Furthermore, for any such that . Proof is given in [49] . The unique 's from Lemma 4 form a vector , which equals to the SWO maximizer from Lemma 1.
Definition 4: (Preference Set): For any price vector , user 's preference set includes each provider with .
In light of Lemma 4, is the set of providers from which user might request a strictly positive amount of resource. Users can now be partitioned to decided and undecided based on the cardinality of their preference sets, analogous to the distinction made in Section III between the single-source and multisource users. The preference set of a decided user contains a singleton, and there is a unique vector that maximizes his payoff. By contrast, the preference set of an undecided user contains more than one provider, and any choice of such that maximizes his payoff. The only potential difference between the concepts of decided/undecided and single-/multisource users is a user who is undecided when facing the prices (several providers to potentially buy from), but is single-source in the final outcome.
There is a close relationship between the support sets from Section III and preference sets defined here. Facing prices , a user may request positive resource only from providers who are in his preference set . By definition, he actually requests positive resource from providers who are in his support set . Thus, the support set of a user is a subset of his preference set:
. We can construct a BGR based on the preference sets and show that this BGR also has no loops with probability 1, following a similar proof (Appendix-A).
Suppose that the optimal Lagrange multipliers from Section III are announced as prices. Since all users have access to complete network information, each of them can calculate all users' preference sets and can construct the corresponding BGR. Undecided users can now uniquely determine their demand vector by independently running the same BGR decoding algorithm. The demand found through BGR decoding is unique as all demand vectors are considered at one time and equality of supply and demand is taken into account. We note that the demand found in this way is only one of an undecided user's infinitely many best responses under prices . However, only the demands given by the BGR decoding algorithm will balance the supply and demand for each provider at the optimal price . We will later show that this is the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game.
B. Equilibrium Strategy of the Providers in Stage I
The optimal choice of prices for the providers depends on how the users' demand changes with respect to the price, which further depends on the users' utility functions. The quantity that indicates how a user's demand changes with respect to the price is the coefficient of relative risk aversion [11] of utility function , i.e.,
. We focus on a class of utility functions characterized in Assumption 4.
Assumption 4: For each user , the coefficient of relative risk aversion of its utility function is less than 1.
Assumption 4 is satisfied by some commonly used utility functions, such as and the -fair utility functions , for [12] . Under Assumption 4, a monopolistic provider will sell all of its resource to maximize its revenue. Intuitively, when a provider lowers its price, the demand of the users increases significantly enough that the change in revenue of the provider is positive. This encourages the provider to lower the price further such that eventually total demand equals total supply. In the case of multiple providers, Assumption 4 also ensures that all providers are willing to sell all their resources to maximize their revenues. In particular, without this assumption, (4) will not hold with equality in the two-stage game, so the connection between the SWO proof and the game proofs no holder holds.
We call the prices that achieve equality of demand and supply market clearing prices.
Theorem 5: Under Assumption 4, the unique socially optimal demand vector and the associated Lagrangian multiplier vector of the SWO problem constitute the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game.
The proof is given in [49] . It is interesting to see that the competition of providers does not reduce social efficiency. This is not a simple consequence of the strict concavity of the users' utility functions; it is also related to the elasticity of users' demands. Assumption 4 ensures that the demands are elastic enough such that a small decrease in price leads to significant increase in demand and thus a net increase in revenue.
Under the optimal prices announced by the providers in the first stage, the users in the second stage will determine the unique demand vector using BGR decoding. On the other hand, if the providers charge prices other than , no best response from the users will make the demand equals to the supply, which is a necessary condition for an equilibrium.
In light of Theorem 5, we will refer to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game as the equlibrium.
C. Number of Undecided Users
Since the presence of undecided users makes the analysis challenging, it is interesting to understand how many undecided users there can be in a given game. It turns out that such number is upper-bounded by the number of providers in the network.
Lemma 6: Under any given price vector in the first stage, the number of undecided users in the second stage is strictly less than .
The proof is given in [49] . The main idea is that if the number of undecided user nodes in a BGR is not smaller than the number of provider nodes, then there exists a loop in the BGR. This, however, occurs with zero probability, as shown in Section III.
V. PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM
The previous analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium has assumed that every player (provider or user) knows the complete information of the system. This may not be true in practice. In this section, we present a distributed primal-dual algorithm where providers and users only know local information and make local decisions in an iterative fashion. We show that such algorithm globally converges to the unique equilibrium discussed in Theorem 5 under mild conditions on the updating rates.
Thekeyproofideaistoshowthattheprimal-dualalgorithmcon-vergestoasetcontainingtheoptimalsolutionofSWO.Wecanfurther show that this set contains only the unique optimal solution in most cases, regardless of the values of the updating rates.
We first present the algorithm, and then the proof of its convergence.
A. Primal-Dual Algorithm
In this section, we will consider a continuous-time algorithm, where all the variables are functions of time. For compactness of exposition, we will sometimes write and when we mean and , respectively. Their time derivatives and will often be denoted by and . We denote by and the unique maximizer of SWO and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier vector, respectively. As shown in Theorem 5, is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game. These values are constant.
To simplify the notation, we denote by or simply the marginal utility of user with respect to when his demand vector is (7) We will use to denote the value of evaluated at , the maximizing demand vector of user . Hence, is a constant that is equal to a user's equilibrium marginal utility as opposed to , which indicates marginal utility at a particular time . We also define and , where all the vectors are column vectors.
We define and
Another way to think of this notation is , where is the indicator function, i.e., if , and 0 otherwise. Motivated by the work in [13] , we consider the following standard primal-dual variable update algorithm.
Here, are the constants representing update rates. The update rule ensures that when a variables of interest ( or ) is already zero, it will not become negative even when the direction of the update (i.e., quantity in the parenthesis) is negative. The tuple controlled by (8) and (9) will be referred to as the solution trajectory of the differential equations system defined by
The motivation for the proposed algorithm is quite natural. A provider increases its price when the demand is higher than its supply and decreases its price when the demand is lower. A user decreases his demand when a price is higher than his marginal utility and increases it when a price is lower. In essence, the algorithm is following the natural direction of market forces.
One key observation is that these updates can be implemented in a distributed fashion. The users only need to know the prices proposed by the providers. The providers only need to know the demand of the users for their own resource, and not for the resource of other providers (as was the case in the analysis of Section IV). In particular, only user needs to know his own channel offset parameters . The first step to prove the algorithm's convergence is to construct a lower-bounded La Salle function and show that its value is nonincreasing for any solution trajectory that satisfies (8) and (9). This will ensure that converge to a set of values that keeps constant.
B. Convergence of the Primal-Dual to an Invariant Set
We consider the following La Salle function:
It can be shown that , i.e., is bounded from below. This ensures that if the function is nonincreasing, it will eventually reach a constant value (which may or may not be the global minimum ).
The derivative of along the solution trajectories of the system, , denoted by , is given by
The value of the La Salle function is nonincreasing along the solution trajectory, defined by (8) and (9), i.e.,
. Proof: Proof is given in [49] . The proof manipulates the expression for and shows that it can be reduced to the following form:
Using concavity of and properties of the equilibrium point , we can show that individual elements of the summations in (10) as . It is clear that the invariant set contains the solution trajectory that has the value of the unique maximizer of SWO for all since . However, it may contain other points as well. When the trajectory enters the invariant set, it either reaches its minimum (i.e., by converging to the unique equilibrium point ), or it gets stuck permanently in some limit cycle. In either case, the trajectory will be confined to a subset of . The remainder of this section is to show that the invariant set contains only the equilibrium point . This will be done in two steps. First, we show that the set has only one element for the majority of provider competition instances, without any restrictions on the variable update rates. Second, we provide a sufficient condition on the update rates so that the global convergences to the unique equilibrium point is also guaranteed in the remaining instances.
C. Convergence When Providers Have Decided Customers
In the following two sections, we consider the properties of the solution trajectory on the invariant set .
The proof of Lemma 7 shows that individual terms on the right-hand side of (10) are nonpositive. Combined with Proposition 8, we get the following result.
Corollary 9: On the invariant set are such that (11) for all (12) where we recall that and .
Expressions (11) and (12) give basic properties of the solution trajectories on the invariant set. We next prove two intermediate results that give further characterization of on . Lemma 10: For any point in the invariant set , we have for all . In other words, any user 's marginal utility with respect to its demand of any provider equals to the corresponding value at the unique equilibrium. In addition, on the invariant set . The proof is given in [49] . Corollary 11: A direct consequence of the first part of Lemma 10 is that on for all (13) The second part of Lemma 10 claims that . From the proof of Lemma 4, we know
. Hence for such that implies that . This is good news since, from Lemma 6, most users have zero demand to all but one provider at the unique equilibrium. Now we know that the same holds on the invariant set . Similarly, only if . We are now ready to claim the main result of this section. Theorem 12: A demand vector of a decided user converges to the equilibrium demand vector, i.e.,
. The price of any provider who has at least one decided user at the equilibrium , converges to the equilibrium price, i.e., . Proof: Consider an arbitrary user who at the equilibrium has only one preferred provider , i.e., for such that , and for . By Corollary 11, this implies and for all . Combined with (13), this means that and , i.e., user 's demand vector converges to its equilibrium value. For provider so by Lemma 15
From this, it follows that . This means that the price of a provider who has at least one decided user has also converged, which completes the proof.
Theorem 13: If every provider has at least one decided customer in the unique equilibrium of the provider competition game, the primal-dual algorithm converges to this equilibrium.
Proof: By Theorem 12, the prices of all providers and the demand vectors of all decided users converge on the invariant set. It remains to be shown that the demand vectors of undecided users also converge. By an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 2, we can draw a BGR for the undecided users. The demand vectors of undecided users that satisfy the constraints on the BGR are unique, and thus also converge.
In most practical cases, where the number of users is much larger than the number of providers, all providers will have at least one decided user, and hence the convergence of the primal-dual algorithm is guaranteed. Next, we study the more complicated case where some providers do not have any associated decided users. In that case, we can still prove the convergence of the primal-dual algorithm under mild conditions of the variable update rates.
D. Convergence When Providers Have No Decided Customers
Without loss of generality, we now focus on the problem where all the users are undecided at the equilibrium. If we can prove that the algorithm converges in this case, then we can also prove convergence in the more general case where some providers have decided users. Let be the number of undecided users, and the number of providers. From Lemma 6, we know that . Theorem 14: Let , and suppose that at the equilibrium for all . The primal-dual algorithm converges to the unique equilibrium if the price update rates are not integer multiples of each other and the demand update rates are equal, i.e., . Proof: We first define some matrices to facilitate the proof. Let be the matrix of channel offsets . Let be the identity matrix of size . Define matrix to be the matrix of vertically stacked identity matrices. Let be a diagonal matrix containing price update rates. Let the diagonal matrix be the matrix of demand update rates whose th entry is , where and , and the off-diagonal entries are all zeros. Here, is the floor function representing the largest integer not larger than .
By (13), we know that the effective resource of all users has converged on the invariant set . We rewrite this as for all , or . We want to express the primal-dual update algorithm (8) and (9) in matrix form. The final hurdle is getting rid of the operation. In particular, we need to exclude the possibility that a variable may oscillate between periods of being zero and being strictly positive.
Lemma 15: For all , for all . In addition, on the invariant set for all . The proof is given in Appendix C. Another way to interpret the Lemma is that for all , the set does not change over time on the invariant set (except perhaps at a single point where ). Hence, now we can write (recall that on the invariant set). This enables us to revise the definition of the update rates matrix to be . Then, (8) and (9) can be written as: (14) (15) Notice that (14) and (15) form a system of linear equations, so the nonlinear primal-dual dynamics defined in (8) and (9) become linear on the invariant set. The following result paves the way to showing that is constant on . Lemma 16: Let and be constant matrices, where ( is a tall matrix), , and . The dimensions of , and are , and , respectively. On the invariant set, . Proof: The proof is obtained by repeatedly differentiating (14) and (15) with respect to time. The more detailed calculation is given in [49] .
If we can prove that the rank of is , then we could write , where is a matrix constructed by taking linearly independent rows of . Then, , which implies that converges on the invariant set. To show that the rank of matrix is , we use [15, Theorem 6.01] (its proof is similar to that of [ , for all . The proof is given in [49] . Combining Lemmas 17 and 18, we see that a unique vector can be computed from equation , meaning that takes a single value on the invariant set and does not change with time. This also means that the demand vector does not change on the invariant set. Therefore, since and , the primal-dual algorithm converges to an equilibrium point, which we call a dynamic equilibrium point. It can be shown that the dynamic equilibrium point is constrained by the same set of equations as the unique equilibrium of the provider competition game (refer to the proof of Theorem 5). Hence, there is only one element in the invariant set , and it corresponds to the equilibrium of the provider competition game, . This concludes the proof of Theorem 14.
Note that the condition on the update rates in Theorem 14 is sufficient but not necessary. In fact, by looking at the form of the matrix from the proof of Lemma 18, we can see that a sufficient condition on the price update rates is that , where , has a different value for each . This condition can be satisfied with probability 1, e.g., by drawing 's and 's independently from some continuous distribution.
Here, we provide some further discussions related to the practicality of the primal-dual algorithm. First, notice that calculating the equilibrium prices efficiently is in general not trivial. This is the key motivation for designing the primal-dual algorithm, which serves as a way to compute the equilibrium (even with complete information). Second, the algorithm can also be used in real networks, admittedly in special circumstances. For example, consider a single network provider that has types of resources and wants to distribute these resources in an optimal manner to users interested in a common goal (e.g., in a sensor network or in a military scenario). The prices, utilities, and demands here are the signals exchanged between the provider and the users in order to achieve network-optimal resource distribution. Furthermore, the algorithm, for all its complexity, converges quite fast (several hundred iterations). It is not impossible to imagine scenarios of extreme network congestion where providers decide that it is better to use an optimal scheme that requires some coordination between them and the users, than to risk a network collapse. Finally, notice that the algorithm works in a myopic fashion: A provider who does not have complete network information can learn through the dynamic interactions in order to reach the equilibrium. This can be viewed as an example of bounded rationality [16] , where the provider can only choose the best response to the current decisions of other providers.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For numerical results, we extend the setup from Example 1, where the resource being sold is the fraction of time allocated to exclusive use of the providers' frequency band, i.e., for . We take the bandwidth of the providers to be MHz, . User 's utility function is , where we compute the spectral efficiency from the Shannon formula is the allocated time fraction, is the ratio of transmit power to thermal noise, and is the individual willingness to pay factor taken to be the same across users. The channel gain amplitudes follow Rayleigh fading, where is a Rayleigh distributed random variable with parameter 1, and is the outdoor power distance loss. We choose the parameters so that the of a user is on average around 3.5 Mb/s when the distance is 50 m, and around 60 Mb/s when the distance is 5 m. The average signal-to-noise ratio at 5 m is around 25 dB. We assume perfect modulation and coding choices such that the communication rates come from a continuum of values. The users are uniformly placed in a 200 200-m area. We want to emphasize that the above parameters are chosen for illustrative purposes only. Our theory applies to any number of providers, any number of users, any type of channel attenuation models, and arbitrary network topologies.
We first consider a single instantiation with 20 users and 5 providers. In Fig. 2 , we show the user-provider association at the equilibrium for a particular realization of channel gains, where the thickness of the link indicates the amount of resource purchased. The users are labeled by numbers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) , and the providers are labeled by letters ( -). This figure shows two undecided users (12 and 16) , and that certain users (1, 7, 13, and 8) do not purchase any resource at equilibrium. For the same realization of channel parameters, Fig. 3 shows the channel quality, user demand, and rate at the equilibrium, for users 5, 10, 12, 15, and 18. We see that user 15 has better channel with provider than with provider , but in the equilibrium, all of his demand is toward provider . This can be explained by looking at the bottom part of Fig. 4 , where the dashed lines indicate equilibrium prices. We see that the provider announces a smaller price than provider . The equilibrium prices reflect the competition among users: In Fig. 2 , we see that provider has many customers located close by, hence it can charge a higher price than other providers while remaining attractive in the market (see Fig. 4 ).
We next consider the convergence time of the discrete-time version of the primal-dual algorithm. We fix the number of providers to be 5, and change the number of users from 20 to 100. For each parameter, we run 200 experiments with randomly generated user and provider locations and plot the average speed of convergence. The convergence is defined as the number of iterations after which the difference between supply and demand is no larger than . Fig. 5 shows the average convergence time for different values of . In general, 200-400 iterations are needed for convergence with , and 100-200 more iterations to get to 10 . In Fig. 6 , we compare the average convergence time for different number of providers. Here, we take the stopping criterion to be . The convergence time depends on the update rates used for the primal-dual: If the update rates are too high, then the variables will tend to oscillate, so the algorithm will take too long to converge. On the other hand, if the rates are too small, the variables may converge too slowly. According to our theoretical analysis from Section V, we randomly assigned update variables to ensure global convergence of the algorithm. In general, a very small or very large number of users per provider means that the algorithm will take longer to converge. Finally, Fig. 7 shows the average convergence time for 5 providers with the standard deviation. The variance of convergence time does not change with the number of users, except for the case of 20 users. Empirically, the algorithm is sensitive to the choice of update rates when the ratio of users per provider is smaller than 4. In such cases, the prices and demands may oscillate and take a long time to converge, which can also be seen in Fig. 6 .
To illustrate the optimality of our proposed primal-dual algorithm, we also implement two benchmark greedy heuristic algorithms. The first heuristic algorithm is an Equal Resource Allocation scheme, where each provider equally allocates its resource to all users in the network, regardless of the channel offset parame- ters. The second heuristic algorithm is the Best Channel scheme, where each user chooses the provider with the best channel offset parameter. Fig. 8 illustrates the comparison, where we simulate 100 random topologies for each user population while keeping the number of providers fixed at 5. It is clear that the performance gap between our proposed optimal algorithm and the heuristic benchmark increases as the number of users increases. When there are 100 users in the network, the performance losses of the two heuristic algorithms are 18% and 61%, respectively. Notice that the standard deviation is due to the randomness of the network topology. Since our proposed primal-dual algorithm is optimal, it always achieves the best performance among three algorithms under any given network topology.
VII. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
One key aspect of our model is that providers charge users based on allocated resources as opposed to users' received ser- vices. This makes reaching a "socially optimal equilibrium" possible. The wireless resource is the quantity that limits the providers. Although users are interested in wireless services, they are forced to pay the "true" price of the service. This turns out to be good news for the users. The users are indirectly exerting externalities on one another by limiting the amount of resources available for others, which raises prices. If users pay for services, then two users who buy the same amount of service pay the same amount. In our model, since the users are charged for the resources, they have to pay for the externality that they are posing to others. Conversely, users who do not cost the providers much (due to good channel conditions) do not have to pay much. This is the main reason that the equilibrium of the game is socially optimal. This is to say that a benevolent social planner, armed with complete knowledge about users utilities and channel gains, will not do a better job distributing the resources of the providers than the market forces reacting to the pressure of user demand. Notice that an arrival (or departure) of a provider will mean that a new set of equilibrium prices would need to be found. Nevertheless, that new set of prices will still lead to a (new) distribution of demand that is socially optimal for the (new) problem. For example, having 10 providers in general means a more severe market competition (i.e., 10 resources to distribute) and thus lower prices than having only 2 providers, but in each of the two cases, the equilibrium resource allocation is socially optimal.
In the model we consider, we observe the "locally monopolistic" nature of wireless commerce, which does not exist for most other traditional goods. Namely, a user that has a strong channel to some provider, but a weak one to others, is willing to pay a higher price to the provider with the strong channel and is thus not influenced by moderate price changes during the price competition. On the other hand, users with similar channel gains to all providers will be more sensitive to price competition. This local monopoly where allocation depends on both price and channel parameters is in contrast to some other (wireless and wireline) resource allocation models where users' association is based solely on the price, in which case all users go to the provider with the cheapest price (see, e.g., [17] ). In our model, the arrival of a new provider will increase the competition, which is good news for the users (the new arrival forces existing providers to lower their prices and allows all users to increase their resource demands). This locally monopolistic nature of the commerce means that the change will not be disruptive, as only some of the users will move to the new provider lured by better channel condition and/or lower prices.
In our model, we use several simplifying assumptions. To be able to model the game as a game of complete information, we need to treat the channel gains of the users as constants. Hence, we assume that the game is played with the coherence interval of the channel and that the channel conditions and utility functions are public knowledge. Without these assumptions, the game would have to be modeled as a game of incomplete information, with a new equilibrium concept (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). This situation is much more difficult to analyze and may not offer many new insights. Practically, the two assumptions mean that our results are more useful in a relatively static wireless setting where channels change less often (e.g., a coffee shop) than for mobile users on the go.
The uniqueness of the SWO maximizing demand vector (Theorem 3) only depends on Assumptions 1-3. However, Theorem 5 requires Assumption 4. Without it, the providers need not sell all of their resource to maximize their profit. In general, without this assumption, the game equilibrium need not be unique, and there may not even be one. If an equilibrium does exist, however, in general it is not socially optimal.
We now comment on some technical issues. We begin with the implications of having undecided users at equilibrium. Given a set of prices, the decided users can calculate the unique demand vector that maximizes their payoffs, while the undecided users have an infinite number of such vectors. In particular, calculating the equilibrium maximizing demand vectors for undecided users may require cooperation between different providers, which may be challenging in practice.
On the other hand, the number of undecided users is small, i.e., not larger than , and it does not grow with the number of users. Future systems may have user action replaced by the actions of software agents in charge of connection and handover between different providers. In this case, splitting over different providers may become feasible. This is similar to soft handoff (soft handover), a feature used by CDMA and WCDMA standards [18] . In addition, when the number of users is large, the impact of a single user on the price may be small. Hence, operating at a nonequilibrium price as the result of the decisions of a few undecided users may not have a great impact on the experienced quality of service, although the exact loss remains to be quantified.
A. Related Work
In this paper, we have considered a linear-usage pricing scheme, which has been widely adopted in the literature (e.g., [6] and [19] ). Analyzing such pricing yields various insights: For example, the existing TCP protocol can be interpreted as a usage-based pricing scheme that solves a network utility maximization problem [6] . In practice, however, providers charge monthly subscription fees. For both voice and data plans, these subscriptions are sometimes combined with linear pricing beyond a predefined usage threshold. Pure linear pricing based on instantaneous channel conditions is generally not used, although it has received renewed attention due to near-saturation of some mobile networks (see, e.g., [20] ). Recently, AT&T introduced hybrid price plans, consisting of a flat rate fee for a certain amount of data, and linear pricing beyond that limit [21] .
There exists a rich body of related literature on using pricing and game theory to study provider resource allocation and interactions of service providers. The related research in the wireless setting can be divided into several categories: optimization-based resource allocation of one provider (e.g., [22] - [27] ), game-theoretic study of interactions between the users of one provider (e.g., [28] - [31] ), competition of different service providers on behalf of the users (e.g., [32] and [33] ), and providers' price competition to attract users (e.g., [34] - [42] ). Our current work falls into the last category.
In our work, we have simultaneously considered several factors that reflect diverse wireless network scenarios: An arbitrary number of wireless providers compete for an arbitrary number of atomic users, where the users are heterogenous both in channels gains and in willingness to pay. In related work where providers price-compete to attract users [34] , [36] , [37] , purchasing a unit of resource from different providers brings the same amount of utility to a user. Reference [43] considered the routing and pricing problem in a wireline network, where users choose the paths for their traffic (elastic or inelastic) by trading off delay and cost. Reference [44] considered how multiple providers compete with different QoS architectures (priority or shared) for different types of applications (voice and Web). Reference [45] considered providers, each providing a multiclass single queue service to the users. Each user chooses which queue and which class to join in order to maximize its payoff by achieving a balance between data rate, delay, and payment. Reference [46] considered the competition between multiple ISPs and showed that a price war will happen if there are many ISPs close by. In our work, a user's utility depends on the channel gain to the provider. Reference [47] considered the competition between two cognitive virtual network operators over the same pool of unlicensed wireless users. None of the results in [43] - [47] considered the provider heterogeneity due to channel conditions. In other work where the Wardrop equilibrium concept is used (e.g., [17] ), users are infinitesimal and nonheterogenous; in our work, users are atomic and have different willingness to pay.
One of the early works that explicitly takes into account the channel differences for different users on a line is [39] , for infinitesimal users and distance-based channel gains. Recently, a model similar to ours was used to treat a three-tier system [38] , although for specific utility functions. The multiple-seller multiple-buyer dynamics in a cognitive radio setting was studied in [40] using evolutionary game theory. Finally, [41] and [42] consider price competition in a multihop wireless network scenario.
The design and proof of the decentralized algorithm were inspired by Chen et al. [13] , with several key differences. First, their work considers the optimal resource allocation of a single OFDM cell. Second, it studies a system where each user has a total power constraint. Third, there are often infinitely many global optimal solutions in the model of [13] . Finally, our convergence results are proved with a set of conditions that are less stringent than those of [13] .
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We provide an overview of the relationship between different concepts used throughout this work in Fig. 9 .
We have studied the competition of an arbitrary number of wireless service providers who want to serve a group of atomic users who are heterogenous in both willingness to pay and channel quality. We have modeled this interaction as a two-stage wireless provider game and have characterized its unique equilibrium. We have shown that the provider competition leads to a unique socially optimal resource allocation for a broad class of utility functions and a generic channel model. Our results show that some users need to purchase their resource from several providers at the equilibrium, although the number of such users is upper-bounded by the number of providers. We have also developed a decentralized algorithm that converges to the equilibrium prices as well as the equilibrium demand vectors using only local knowledge.
Further work may include the study of fractional equilibria with the goal of characterizing the losses that occur when undecided users are unable to split their resource demand in an optimal way. It is also interesting to consider communication models where users cause externalities such as interference to each other.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of BGR Property 3
We first examine the properties of the optimal demand vector of the SWO problem. We will express the SWO in terms of the demand vector only, by substituting directly (3) into (2) . Let be the vector of Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian for SWO is then (16) It is easy to check that the SWO problem satisfies the Slater's condition [48] , and thus the sufficient and necessary KKT conditions for an optimal solution are as follows: where with some abuse of notation we use to denote .
The following characterizes the relationship between the prices of any two providers to which a user has strictly positive demand.
Recall the support set definition . From (17) , we see that . Then, from (18), we can see that only when . Hence, is a necessary condition for for all . Then, and implies . In particular, and implies (22) We now consider the BGR defined by the support sets of multisource users. For any two edges and of BGR, where is the user index and are the provider indices, and , so by (22), we have . Suppose that a loop exists in BGR (refer to Fig. 10 for this part of the proof). Then, a sequence of nodes exists, where are the user nodes and are the provider nodes, such that and are edges in BGR for (with defined as ). We assume that the members of the sequence are distinct, otherwise there is already a smaller loop inside. Since both and are edges, then , based on (22) 
. A loop in the BGR implies
Since is a function of independent continuous random variables, it is also a continuous random variable itself. The probability that the product of independent continuous random variables equals a constant is zero, so we can conclude that a BGR has loops with probability zero. In other words, a BGR has no loop with probability one.
B. BGR Algorithm
Let be the set of edges, and and be the set of all user and provider nodes, respectively, present in the BGR. The demand of multisource users can be found using Algorithm 1. find a leaf node and associated edge 6:
if the leaf node is a user node then 7: 8: else 9: 10: end if 11: and 12:
remove edge 13: end while
We now give an informal description of an algorithm that finds the optimal and unique values of for multisource users. Since BGR has no loops, it is a (unrooted) tree. Hence, we can run a simple iterative algorithm that removes a leaf node (node with a single incoming edge) and its associated edge at each iteration. We begin by finding a leaf node in the BGR. We then determine the demand of the edge associated to the leaf node either from BGR Property 1) or 2). Using this value, we update the check-sum value of its parent node. Then, we remove the leaf node and the associated edge. This completes one iteration. We repeat the process until there are no more edges in the graph.
The key for Algorithm 1 to work is that the BGR has no loops, so a leaf node can always be found in line 5. Notice that in the last iteration, there will be only one user node and one provider node left connected by an edge with value . The checksums for these two nodes are and , which satisfy since and . Upon completion of the algorithm, the demand of multisource users is uniquely defined.
C. Proof of Lemma 15
We first prove that the set of positive demands does not change over time on the invariant set. Roughly speaking, for a user's demand variable to become zero, it needs to have a negative derivative. Due to the form of the primal, this derivative discontinuously becomes zero when the variable itself reaches zero. On the other hand, derivatives of all demand variables are coupled by a single equation at all times. For this equation to be maintained, there needs to be a discontinuity somewhere else in the opposite direction. But, this cannot happen due to the form of the primal-dual system of equations. Technical proof follows.
It suffices to show that any demand variable such that cannot become zero on the invariant set for any duration of time (we allow for the case where the variable gets reduced to zero at a single point in time, and then starts increasing again). We prove so by contradiction. Suppose that but for all such that , where is a small number.
We choose small enough so that the derivative , which means that . At , either or . We consider the first case:
. Then, there exists some small such that , for all . Then, (8) . Then, if we label by (the left derivative at ) and by (the right derivative), we have and , where (at the "jumps" from being negative to zero).
On the other hand, differentiating (13) with respect to time yields and . Then, we have and . In other words, to compensate for the discrete jump from to zero (a finite positive increase), there needs to be a finite negative jump for . However, since all are continuous and from (8) , it can be seen that there are no negative jumps in . In other words,
